The following story was shared by Detective Michael Chaves. It describes how he's used Volatility, KnTDD, and memory forensics over the past year to investigate POS breaches at local businesses. Kudos to Michael for applying his skills in an effective and meaningful way, then taking the time to share experiences with others. Without a doubt, detectives in every police department have or will encounter situations like Michael describes.
It's been about year since I've taken the Volatility Windows Malware and Memory Forensics Training in NYC. I wanted to take this time to share some of my experiences to hopefully help examiners/investigators early on in their exposure to Volatility and to help identify unknown malware. Over the past 10 months I have responded to about a dozen POS breaches at local businesses; mainly liquor stores and restaurants. These breaches are identified rather quickly from local banks that call me with the details and I usually respond to a location within 2 days. It should come as no surprise that I have yet to respond to a location that was anywhere near being PCI compliant.The large majority of POS terminals were running Windows XP some with SP2, most with SP3. Two machines were even running Windows 2K and all had direct connections to the Internet. Antivirus IF present was either out of date or turned off. I still have yet to see a firewall present or any security policy in place. My RAM capture tool of choice is Kntdd and I’ll use FTK Imager Lite to obtain all registry files, App Data directory, $log, $MFT and prefetch directory. I carry with me several portable drives to make the acquisition from each POS location in the shortest amount of time possible as the store still needs to process customer purchases.For most of these breaches I have been able to identify the malware pretty easily. I usually begin by running, pslist, psscan, psxview and connections (if supported). In the majority of the breaches, the processes were not hidden and had an active process listed, usually called by ‘explorer’. If I was not able to easily identify the malware process, I’d run dlllist to locate any programs running from odd locations followed by malfind and yarascan. Once I have identified a suspect process, I’d dump that process usually by procdump or dlldump.During the early part of the investigation, I am not too concerned how the malware works or what the Initial Infection Vector was. I want to know where the credit cards are going and how are they getting out. I’d run strings on the exported out suspected malware file and I would generally find, the URL used to send out the cards via POST, an e-mail address associated with the malware and/or IP addresses. The majority of my cases the POST command was used to send out the cards, in others it was via SMTP. In 5 of my 12 breaches, the malware family was JACKPOS or Alina variants. I will search the Internet on file names, URL’s and artifacts that usually result with great write ups that show what I may be investigating, as well researching with Virustotal. It should also be noted that there have been a few times that I sought assistance from the Volatility community and other students from the NYC class. They have been extremely receptive to my questions and information provided to was invaluable!I realize there are many readers out there that have a far greater understanding of malware and memory forensics. I’m slowly getting there, but I hope this helps out the people just beginning, like I am/was by describing my workflow and perhaps give confidence to some that may otherwise doubt their ability.